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Introduction 
South Sudan has for forty years been a crucible of 
experimentation in the field of humanitarianism in 
situations of conflict. Humanitarian operations have been 
critical in saving lives, providing essential medical care, 
documenting the plight of South Sudan’s people, and 
connecting South Sudanese with the international 
community. South Sudanese and foreign humanitarians 
have shown courage, commitment and professionalism, 
and have achieved much of which they can be proud. At 
the same time, the pitfalls of extended humanitarian 
assistance in such situations have been hotly debated, 
not least because large-scale humanitarian operations 
have become an integral part of the politics, economy and 
society of South Sudan.1 Over the course of generations, 
humanitarian activities, in their most practical sense of 
providing life-sustaining material aid, have become 
deeply embroiled in complicated ways with the political 
economy of organised violence. Aid operations have also 
become woven into the daily lives, languages and 
cultures of South Sudanese people. Both scholars and 
humanitarian practitioners need to continue to explore 
and respond to these complex dynamics.  
The manner in which humanitarian assistance has 
become embedded in society has also played a role in 
shaping power relations between international and local 
actors. It has implications for the dignity and agency of 
people affected by war, hunger and deprivation. Most of 
the academic and policy-related knowledge on South 
Sudan is produced by foreigners and for the consumption 
of foreigners. Therefore, external institutions and 
agendas tend to overshadow or distort local initiatives by 
South Sudan’s community of scholars, researchers and 
activists. South Sudanese intellectuals and thinkers have 
no platform to correct powerful misconceptions. South 
Sudanese are also drastically under-represented at the 
policy making and senior management levels in the aid 
industry, despite their generations-long experience of 
working alongside emergency aid.  
This is a missed opportunity for utilising human capital 
and social resources available among South Sudanese 
academics and experts.  Many humanitarians are deeply 
                                               
1 The first activities by international NGOs in southern Sudan 
date back to the post-Addis Ababa Agreement rehabilitation 
programmes in the 1970s. International NGOs took over 
responsibility for service delivery in entire districts, to the extent 
that Torit was nicknamed ‘Little Norway’ due to Norwegian 
Church Aid’s programming in the area. 
2 This is reflected in development indices. South Sudan ranks at 
187 out of 189 at the bottom of the Human Development Index. 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI 
aware of the complicated contexts of their work but 
struggle to access the in-depth knowledge they need 
while also grappling with the practical challenges of 
implementing programmes.  At the same time, ignoring 
South Sudanese expertise risks a deep and lasting 
disempowerment of South Sudanese citizens with 
respect to one of the more important and enduring 
governance challenges for their country. South Sudan’s 
humanitarian needs are serious and urgent, but they have 
also proven persistent.2 South Sudanese researchers and 
scholars need new opportunities and forums to develop 
their own ideas and agendas in response, and to 
influence humanitarian policy.  
This paper offers reflections from a panel of twelve 
prominent South Sudanese scholars, academics and 
activists. The panel discussion took place during a three-
day meeting in Arusha, Tanzania under the auspices of 
the Conflict Research Programme (CRP), a UK 
Department for International Development (DFID)-funded 
initiative at the London School of Economics (LSE).3 The 
panel’s aim was to review and reflect upon the research 
and policy recommendations of the CRP; to create a 
novel space for debates between South Sudanese 
intellectuals; and to develop policy-relevant insights. The 
panel was informed by historical precedents, recalling that 
Sudanese scholars were previously at the forefront of 
knowledge production on refugee studies. South 
Sudanese intellectuals are working to regenerate and 
amplify the flow of ideas from South to North.  
Several panellists have direct policy-making experience 
through roles in the South Sudanese government, the 
United Nations (UN) and other organisations. These 
individuals’ research and professional work during the 22-
year civil war (1983-2005) has shaped foundational 
assumptions of how to approach more nuanced 
programming in the humanitarian sector. The panellists 
continue to play important roles in shaping the way 
humanitarianism is understood through their research 
and teaching at South Sudanese universities and through 
their work with conflict-affected communities on the 
ground.  
Recent research has highlighted the importance of 
3 The CRP aims to understand why contemporary violence is so 
difficult to end and to analyse the underlying political economy 
of violence with a view to informing policy. In addition to South 
Sudan, the CRP is conducting research in Iraq, Syria, Somalia 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo. For additional 
information, visit the CRP page on the LSE website at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/conflict-and-
civil-society/conflict-research-programme.  
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making better use of South Sudanese expertise in 
shaping contemporary approaches to humanitarian aid. 
An unpublished report by the Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) and the United States Institute of Peace 
(USIP) on the humanitarian response in South Sudan 
advised humanitarians to proactively seek the advice of 
South Sudanese experts, as well as international experts, 
on how to strengthen humanitarian operations.4 This 
panel provides an opportunity to reflect on the potential 
contributions that South Sudanese experts could make in 
the current context.  
The paper examines humanitarianism across four 
thematic areas:  
• Accountability.  The first section looks at a range of 
issues relating to accountability in the humanitarian 
sector, including starvation crimes under 
international law and the use of customary justice 
mechanisms to address disputes that arise as a 
consequence of severe hunger.  
• Activism.  The second section discusses 
humanitarian activism and describes instances in 
which South Sudanese have demonstrated 
resilience and heroism in the context of an intense 
and protracted war.  
• Authority.  The third section assesses the ways in 
which the humanitarian intervention affects the 
legitimacy and responsiveness of public authorities 
at various levels of governance.  
• Access.  The fourth section focuses on humanitarian 
access and seeks to understand the interests and 
motivations of state and non-state actors who 
engage with humanitarian operations.  
The conclusion summarises the key points and offers a 
series of recommendations for humanitarian actors to 
consider in their efforts to design and implement 
programmes in a highly fluid context. 
                                               
4 This paper was circulated to international donors and selected 
others. The paper was made available to the South Sudanese 
scholars who attended the panel, but it also raises important 
questions about restrictions upon the flow of ideas and 
knowledge.   
5 For analysis of the growing importance of political decision and 
military tactics in creating famine, see Alex de Waal, The end of 
famine? Prospects for the elimination of mass starvation by 
political action, Political Geography, Vol. 62 (Jan. 2018), 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629817
302871!.  
6 Francesco Checchi, Adrienne Testa, Abdihamid Warsame, Le 
Quach, Rachel Burns. Estimates of crisis-attributable mortality in 
South Sudan, December 2013-April 2018. London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, September 2018. 
Humanitarianism and accountability 
The famine declared in Leer and Mayendit counties in 
February 2017 demonstrated the extent to which hunger 
has become a weapon of war in South Sudan.5 By June 
2017, the extreme famine in that pocket had eased, but 
hunger continued to grow in other parts of the country. 
Demographic estimates are that 383,000 people have 
died of violence, hunger and disease since the outbreak 
of war6—a massive humanitarian disaster under any 
definition. 5.3 million South Sudanese were severely food 
insecure in January 2018, a 40 percent increase from 
January 2017.7  
Casualty rates among humanitarian workers shed further 
light on abuses in the humanitarian sector. At least 100 
humanitarian workers have been killed since the start of 
the conflict, and South Sudan has been the most 
dangerous country for humanitarian workers for several 
years running.8 Although humanitarians of all 
backgrounds have been killed it is notable that the 
majority of these deaths have been among national aid 
workers.9 This is a further manifestation of the complex 
power politics at play. 
The subsections below explore opportunities for 
accountability at various levels of governance and the 
implications that access to information has for prospects 
for accountability. A key objective in this regard is to try to 
reset the moral compass of the political and military 
establishment so that famine and severe hunger are once 
again seen to be morally abhorrent.  
Opportunities for accountability  
Several opportunities present themselves for 
accountability at the regional, national and local levels. 
Globally, there have not yet been any criminal 
prosecutions for starvation crimes, but international 
practice is now heading in that direction with the adoption 
of UN Security Council Resolution 2417 in May 2018. 
https://www.lshtm.ac.uk/newsevents/news/2018/war-south-
sudan-estimated-have-led-almost-400000-excess-deaths  
7 How to declare a famine: A primer from South Sudan, IRIN (5 
Mar. 2018), https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2018/03/05/how-
declare-famine-primer-south-sudan.  
8 Aid Worker Killings Rise, Fueled by Conflict in South Sudan, 
Syria, Voice of America (VOA) (13 Aug. 2018), 
https://www.voanews.com/a/aid-worker-killings-rise-south-
sudan-syria/4526853.html.  
9 According to the Aid Worker Security Database, 100 aid 
workers have been killed in South Sudan since December 
2013, including 95 national and 5 international aid workers. See 
Humanitarian Outcomes, Aid Worker Security 
Database, (2018), https://aidworkersecurity.org/ 
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Resolution 2417 expresses the international community’s 
concern with the threat of conflict-induced famine and 
calls on states to conduct investigations into the use of 
starvation as a method of warfare and take action against 
those responsible.10 Since starvation crimes are 
recognised as war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
the African Union (AU) would have a right to intervene 
under Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act.11 There may also 
be opportunities for the Hybrid Court of South Sudan 
(HCSS), if and when it is established, to bring such cases. 
Starvation crimes have not been documented to the 
extent that other international crimes have, and pose 
specific difficulties for legal recourse, so there will be a 
need for additional efforts in this area to allow for such 
prosecutions in the future.  
National justice institutions in South Sudan should, 
theoretically, also be able to hold individuals and groups 
accountable for starvation crimes, although the lack of 
independence of these institutions would likely present an 
insurmountable obstacle to such efforts in the short-
term.12 If criminal prosecution through the national courts 
is not feasible, other sorts of initiatives could be explored. 
For example, Harriet Kuyang, a lecturer at the Juba 
University College of Law and Institute of Peace, 
Development and Security Studies, argues that existing 
practices and local knowledge of justice and 
reconciliation, which tends to adopt a reparative approach 
that prioritises the rebuilding of relationships and repairing 
of harms to victims rather than the punishment of 
perpetrators, could play an important complementary role 
in shaping transitional justice processes in South 
Sudan.13 Another precedent for reparative approaches 
can be seen in the notions of community land ownership 
and ‘taking towns to the people’ that arose in the context 
of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) and were framed as a means of 
recognising the sacrifice that rural communities made 
during the long liberation struggle. Memorials to victims of 
famine crimes could provide yet another means of 
                                               
10 UNSC Resolution 2417 (2018), U.N. Doc. S/RES/2417, 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-
6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/s_res_2417.pdf.  
11 AU Constitutive Act, Art. 4(h) (2000) (stating that the AU shall 
have a right ‘to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a 
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’), 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32020-file-
constitutiveact_en.pdf.  
12 See e.g., American Bar Association, Assessment of Justice, 
Accountability and Reconciliation Measures in South Sudan: 
Final Report and Recommendations (Jun. 2014), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/roli/su
dan/aba_roli_sudan_assessment_final_report_0614.authcheck
dam.pdf; International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), South 
recognising their sacrifice and promoting norms against 
such conduct by armed groups. 
Various forms of political accountability could also serve 
as an alternative if criminal accountability mechanisms 
are inaccessible. For example, if severe hunger results 
from acts of neglect or incompetence caused by the 
misappropriation of public resources and the consequent 
failure to pay salaries for public servants, criminal 
accountability may not be appropriate but political 
accountability should still apply. In other contexts, for 
example, the people responsible would likely lose their 
positions if such misconduct were exposed.  
As one panellist pointed out, at the local level in South 
Sudan, a very different sort of accountability mechanism 
is also available in the form of customary norms that 
recognise the right to food. In Bahr-el-Ghazal during the 
1990s, for example, customary courts would often hear 
cases relating to the distribution of food items. Following 
up this observation, the CRP conducted research in Bahr-
el-Ghazal in July and August 2018 and confirmed that 
customary courts continue to play a similar role in the 
current context. The customs of many groups in South 
Sudan place moral obligations on relatives or community 
members to provide for the hungry and to prevent 
undignified death.  In famine-prone areas they may 
recognise the right of a starving person to acquire food 
even if it means taking someone else’s crops or livestock.  
The Dinka chiefs’ courts in Bahr-el-Ghazal rely on the 
ability to shame people for failing to provide for their 
families. Additional research can help to clarify the role 
and extent of existing institutions and norms in promoting 
accountability and mitigating harms at the local level.14 
Besides the political accountability of national actors, the 
donors and implementers of external assistance 
(multilateral organisations and NGOs) have a share in 
accountability not only to their constituencies but also to 
the recipients of aid.  International actors need to be 
attentive to, and held accountable for, their potential to 
Sudan: An Independent Judiciary in an Independent State? 
(2013), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/530cb3604.pdf.   
13 Harriet Kuyang, Exploring Linkages of Traditional and Formal 
Mechanism of Justice and Reconciliation in South Sudan (Jan. 
2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3102242.  
14 For a discussion of the role of customary courts during the 
conflict see e.g. Rachel Ibreck and Naomi Pendle, Customary 
Protection? Chiefs’ Courts as Public Authority in United Nations 
Protection of Civilians Sites, South Sudan, Justice and Security 
Research Programme (JSRP) (Sep. 2016), 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/84472/1/JSRP-34.Ibreck.Pendle.pdf. 
Documentation of the ‘hunger courts’ has been started within 
the CRP. 
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exacerbate as well as alleviate hunger. Research on the 
1998 Bahr-el-Ghazal famine showed that international 
partners could contribute to increased vulnerability to 
famine.15  
Access to information 
There is a close correlation between access to quality 
information and the prevention of famine and 
humanitarian emergencies. A free press, for example, is 
a critical means of alerting the authorities of an impending 
crisis and calling to account those responsible for failures 
to prevent or mitigate starvation. As Amartya Sen 
famously proclaimed, ‘No famine has ever taken place in 
the history of the world in a functioning democracy.’16 The 
lack of access to information in the humanitarian sector 
has had real consequences in South Sudan. During the 
famine in Bahr-el-Ghazal in the late 1990s, for example, 
the response was slow in part due to a lack of data to 
show that severe hunger was leading to famine. Similar 
criticisms have been made of humanitarian responses in 
the current situation.17 For example, in 2018, 
humanitarians were slow to realise the scale of hunger in 
parts of Gogrial.   
Access to information suffers from numerous constraints 
in the South Sudanese context. Public authorities often 
demonstrate an extreme sensitivity to criticism and an 
unwillingness to accept facts that do not serve their 
interests.  Plus, there is a tendency among many 
humanitarian actors to fund research only for their internal 
consumption without a commitment to publish or publicly 
share the understanding acquired.  Research that is being 
publicly funded by taxpayers in donor countries is not 
being made available for public benefit, raising ethical 
concerns. In addition, the lack of quality information 
impedes civic mobilisation efforts and undermines the 
development of an environment that is conducive to 
accountability in the humanitarian sector.  
Among the factors contributing to the lack of reliable 
information is the under-representation of South 
Sudanese in the humanitarian sector. For example, 
panellists were only able to name two South Sudanese 
country directors of international NGOs (INGOs) in South 
Sudan. For a large-scale humanitarian intervention that is 
several decades old, the lack of South Sudanese at the 
                                               
15 Luka Biong Deng, The Sudan Famine of 1998: Unfolding of 
the Global Dimension. IDS Bulletin. Vol 33(2) (2002), 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/43539715.pdf  
16 Amartya Sen, Democracy as Freedom, Oxford University 
Press (1999).  
17 For more on the discomfort that information systems have in 
senior management level suggests that donors have 
given insufficient priority to building this capacity. The 
scarcity of senior South Sudanese in these positions 
raises the question of whether there is a mismatch 
between the modus operandi of international aid agencies 
and local socio-political realities. In addition, the scarcity 
of South Sudanese in leadership positions needs to be 
understood in the context of previous Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) policies and 
practices, including historical failures to expand access to 
education and active efforts to discourage such 
employment, with particularly acute and lasting impacts in 
some regions.  During the first three years of Operation 
Lifeline Sudan (OLS), South Sudanese were prevented 
from working with aid agencies by the SPLM/A out of fear 
that it would encourage desertion from the frontlines.  
The problem of lack of information in the humanitarian 
sector is compounded by the large turnover among 
foreign staff, most of whom do not stay for more than one 
or two years in the country. There is also often a spatial 
and social disconnectedness between humanitarian 
agencies and the populations that they serve. This is 
exaggerated in times of conflict as there is a trend towards 
the remote management of emergency operations. These 
and other factors contribute to a lack of reliable 
intelligence and a tendency to opt for the less risky 
options even if they are likely to result in unintended 
consequences that undermine accountability.   
A related problem concerns the lack of national 
researchers in the production of knowledge about South 
Sudan. Whether research commissioned by humanitarian 
agencies, or journal articles that are produced and peer 
reviewed outside the country without input from South 
Sudanese academics, most knowledge production rests 
in the hands of foreigners. As a result, research often fails 
to prioritise matters of interest to South Sudanese 
audiences and contributes to the information gaps around 
key issues, such as the efficacy of existing systems in 
providing support during times of severe hunger or 
famine. South Sudanese ideas are also critical to finding 
a lasting political solution to the conflict, and the lack of 
resources to enable this thought leadership may help 
explain the lack of imagination in recent peace processes. 
 
dealing with conflict and its impact on food security, see Daniel 
Maxwell et al., Constraints and Complexities of Information and 
Analysis in Humanitarian Emergencies: Evidence from South 
Sudan, Feinstein International Center (Jun. 2018).   
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Humanitarian activism 
Humanitarian activity in the context of armed conflict is, at 
best, damage mitigation. True relief from humanitarian 
crisis is possible only in the context of peace and a 
political settlement that addresses the issues that lead to 
war. Nonetheless, activists can play an important role in 
creating conditions that are conducive to such a 
settlement. Given the vulnerability of international 
agencies to political pressure, much of the more visible 
activism in the humanitarian sector is undertaken by 
national actors, including civil society, the church, 
traditional authorities, and individual citizens. Such efforts 
to alleviate suffering and build peace at a very local level 
are often overshadowed by national or international 
peace processes that focus on securing political 
settlements among small groups of elites. 
The subsections below explore a number of areas in 
which donors and humanitarian agencies could be more 
creative in supporting efforts to promote peace and 
alleviate suffering at a very local level. They suggest that 
humanitarian agencies could think more innovatively 
about how they engage with ‘the institutions that are really 
meaningful in people’s lives,’ such as kinship networks, 
clan and age-set systems, churches and schools, rather 
than simply approaching the problem through the lenses 
of their own institutions, the state and narrow definitions 
of ‘civil society.’18  
Importance of local champions 
Among the issues that do not receive the attention that 
they deserve are the heroic efforts by South Sudanese in 
every walk of life to provide support to their fellow citizens 
in the midst of conflict.19 One of the panellists recounted 
how when the conflict first broke out, he raised $6,000 
dollars and went to the Protection of Civilians (POCs) site 
every day with supplies targeting pregnant women. 
Another story that has become popular relates to the 
                                               
18 Freddie Carver, A ‘call to peacebuilding’: rethinking 
humanitarian and development activity in South Sudan, 
Humanitarian Exchange, No. 68, Humanitarian Practice 
Network (HPN) and Overseas Development Institute (ODI) 
(Jan. 2017). In South Sudan, civil society tends to be used 
principally to refer to NGOs.  
19 Missed Out: The role of local actors in the humanitarian 
response in South Sudan, Christian aid, Cafod, Troicaire, 
Oxfam and Tearfund (Apr. 2016), 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachmen
ts/rr-missed-out-humanitarian-response-south-sudan-280416-
en.pdf. For a counter-argument that questions the assumption 
that NGOs are particularly well-equipped to deliver assistance 
in emergency situations, see Soforonio Efuk, ‘Humanitarianism 
that harms’: A critique of NGO charity in Southern Sudan, Civil 
Wars, Vol. 3 (20 Sep. 2007), 
heroic actions of a chief from Jebel Dinka who protected 
many of his Nuer neighbours when the conflict broke out 
in Juba in December 2013. These types of stories abound 
in South Sudan. As Freddie Carver has argued, if 
humanitarian agencies can find ways ‘to invest in 
increasing the resources available to ordinary South 
Sudanese independently of [militarised] authorities,’ then 
they might be able to change the incentives that drive 
people to support armed groups.20 
One of the challenges in this regard is the channelling of 
funds away from civic actors and towards large 
international humanitarian agencies. After the outbreak of 
the conflict in December 2013, a number of large 
programmes assisting civil society were cancelled or 
dramatically scaled down. These changes in funding 
priorities have far-reaching impacts on civic actors and 
suggest a failure to appreciate the important roles that 
civil society, faith-based institutions and traditional 
authorities play in providing local, spontaneous 
responses in times of humanitarian emergency.21  
International donors had mistakenly perceived civil 
society’s role to be limited to building political liberty in 
times of peace and state building. However, such civil 
authorities have much more far reaching roles. For 
example, through the training of community paralegals 
and the monitoring of justice sector, institutions at the 
local level can help to contribute to civilian protection and 
social cohesion even during times of conflict.22  With 
relatively little financial input as compared to the broader 
humanitarian intervention, donor funds can help to protect 
the integrity of these systems and build resilience among 
conflict-affected populations.  
Humanitarianism in the education sector 
Panellists had particularly moving stories to share about 
their experiences with humanitarianism in the education 
sector. Their stories illustrate how educational institutions 
provide spaces of protection, struggle and change, where 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/136982400084024
4.  
20 Carver, A ‘call to peacebuilding’.  
21 See e.g., Mark Massoud, Work Rules: How International 
NGOs Build Law in War Torn Societies, Law and Society 
Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 (2015). 
22 See Rachel Ibreck, Sexual violence is rife in South Sudan – 
but a new female head chief could help bring change (11 June 
2018). 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/south-sudan-
sexual-violence-new-female-chief-rebecca-nyandier-chatim-
womens-rights-a8383861.html. The work of lawyers and 
paralegals during the conflict in South Sudan and their 
contributions to humanitarianism will also be addressed in a 
forthcoming book by the same author.   
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South Sudanese can come together without placing their 
political or ethnic identities at the forefront.  In that regard, 
educational institutions are among what Eddie Thomas 
and Natalia Chan have called the ‘positive spaces where 
civic values still have relevance.’23 This field tends to be 
neglected in research and policy agendas during conflict, 
but the vignettes drawn from the lived experience of South 
Sudanese panel members indicate the scope for further 
research and action.  
One panellist recalled returning to his university after the 
outbreak of conflict in 2013 to find that several of his 
students were missing, to the extent that it became too 
painful for the class to take the register. Over time, some 
of the missing students returned to class, but they had 
been traumatised and were not themselves. Yet although 
the students had been exposed to ethnic discourses and 
violence, they were determined to continue their learning 
and often offered each other support. This story illustrates 
how educational institutions have become nodes of 
conflict and peace where resilience can be nurtured. 
Another panellist recalled her efforts to try to secure 
higher education for displaced students in the POCs. In 
the early days of the conflict, students were not able to 
travel to the university without risking threats or violence 
from armed men. With the support of an international 
organisation, the panellist helped to establish a centre in 
the POCs that would allow them to communicate with 
their lecturers.24 In 2015, they were able to graduate 20 
students and more have graduated since. The panellist 
has worked with the United Nations Mission in South 
Sudan (UNMISS) to establish two secondary schools in 
the POCs and she was able to convince the Minister of 
Education to allow several students to sit for their exams 
in the POCs. In many respects, the education sector is 
among the hardest hit by the conflict. For example, South 
Sudan is reported to have the highest percentage of 
children out of school in the world.25 However, despite the 
toll that the conflict has taken, people are working to 
navigate these hostile environments and build the human 
resources that can help to build resilience and stabilise 
the situation.  
Additionally, several innovative programmes to provide 
education opportunities to senior military officers have 
been initiated in recent years. At the Juba University 
                                               
23 For additional advice on humanitarian investments in ‘spaces 
of hope’, see Eddie Thomas and Natalia Chan, South Sudan: 
wrong turn at the crossroads? Humanitarian Exchange, No. 68, 
HPN and ODI (Jan. 2017).  
24 While experts have recommended the adoption of longer-
term funding cycles that seek to build resilience among 
displaced populations in the POCs, translating that into practice 
Institute of Peace, Development and Security Studies, for 
example, professors initiated a programme to allow 
military officers whose educational careers were 
interrupted by the 22-year war to finish their degrees. The 
curriculum included in-depth study of national and 
international law, including South Sudan’s national 
security policy. Although they have faced some resource 
constraints, the Institute is still trying to maintain the 
programme.  
Humanitarianism and authority 
The impact that humanitarian interventions have on public 
authority raises a number of familiar questions and 
dilemmas. Among the central tenets of humanitarianism 
is that assistance should be provided in an impartial and 
independent manner based on need alone, but is it 
possible to adhere to this principle in a highly politicised 
conflict situation? When people lack even the essential 
requirements to satisfy their daily needs, is it not 
inevitable that more powerful actors will seek to 
manipulate humanitarian assistance to their advantage? 
Perhaps these are problems without solutions and 
humanitarian actors should just focus on saving lives and 
not overly concern themselves with the unintended 
consequences of their actions. But if the unintended 
consequences include legitimising state and non-state 
actors that stand accused of grave violations of 
international human rights and humanitarian law, 
undermining the government’s accountability to its 
citizens, and possibly even prolonging the conflict, can 
humanitarian actors afford to continue with business as 
usual?  
The subsections below delve into several of these 
questions from a more pragmatic viewpoint that 
recognises the inherently political nature of humanitarian 
interventions and considers how humanitarian actors 
might limit the negative consequences of their actions. 
Impact on legitimacy and accountability 
Among the critiques of large-scale humanitarian 
interventions is that they serve to legitimise state and non-
state actors, provide them with material resources, and 
undermine their accountability to citizens. A number of 
narratives are typically used to explain this relationship:  
has been a challenge. See Michael Arensen, ‘If we leave we 
are killed’: Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of 
Civilian Sites 2013-2016, International Organization of Migration 
(IOM) (Jan. 2016), 
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/if_we_leave_0.pdf.  
25 Global Initiative on Out of School Children. 
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• The channelling of aid through Juba and the control 
that the state exerts over where support goes confers 
legitimacy on a government that has been implicated 
in very serious violations of international human 
rights and humanitarian law.  
• The government is able to claim credit for allowing 
aid to reach populations in need, even as it fails to 
deliver public services and goods to the people. 
Since it does not have to pay for service delivery, 
state resources can be channelled to security, 
corruption cartels and other sectors that are less 
accountable to the people.  
• Humanitarian assistance increases the power of 
state and non-state actors, whether indirectly by 
allowing them to invest more in security or more 
directly through taxation, the diversion of 
humanitarian assets, and market interactions 
between political elites and humanitarian agencies. 
This increase in power in turn confers its own form of 
legitimacy. 
A central dilemma for humanitarian actors is that they are 
trying to convince the government of its responsibility to 
address the needs of its citizens even as they are 
providing services in its place.   
As noted in the introduction, large-scale humanitarian 
operations in South Sudan date back to the 1970s and 
their impact on public authority has long been discussed. 
However, the relationship between the government and 
the international community has taken on a different tone 
in the current conflict. In the previous war, OLS 
channelled humanitarian assistance through the SPLM/A. 
Efforts to establish mechanisms such as the humanitarian 
principles were undercut in the mid-1990s when the 
United States made a political decision to support the 
SPLM/A in its struggle against the regime in Khartoum, 
mainly on account of the latter’s sponsorship of terrorists, 
after which the SPLA’s diversion of humanitarian assets 
and obstruction of aid were systematically overlooked or 
downplayed.  
In the current conflict, the expectations of humanitarian 
actors have changed, and the international community is 
                                               
26 Daniel Maxwell et al., Questions and Challenges Raised by a 
Large-Scale Humanitarian Operation in South Sudan, Secure 
Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) (13 May 2015), 
https://securelivelihoods.org/wp-content/uploads/Questions-
and-Challenges-Raised-by-a-Large-Scale-Humanitarian-
Operation-in-South.pdf. 
27 Lindsay Hamsik, A thousand papercuts: the impact of NGO 
regulation in South Sudan, Humanitarian Exchange, No. 68, 
HPN and ODI (Jan. 2017), https://odihpn.org/wp-
closely scrutinising misconduct by state and non-state 
actors.26 At the same time, there remains a high degree 
of continuity among the South Sudanese authorities, 
many of whom have similar expectations of humanitarian 
actors as during the last war. These diverging 
expectations account for some of the daily tensions 
between the government and humanitarian actors. The 
government feels as though humanitarian agencies do 
not respect its authority and that they are acting with little 
oversight or accountability. The government responds by 
placing onerous regulatory requirements on humanitarian 
actors and intimidating them into silence on matters of 
public interest.27 Regulations are often interpreted as 
money-making activities and an excuse to extract NGO 
money. When the warring parties are able to control the 
actions of humanitarian agencies it reinforces their 
authority as important political actors in the eyes of the 
people.  
Impact on relationships among people 
A related question concerns the impact that humanitarian 
interventions have on reciprocal relationships within and 
between communities.  Decades of foreign aid have 
reshaped responses to war and famine. For example, in 
the 1970s, following the Addis Ababa Agreement, aid was 
known as ‘totin’, literally meaning national resettlement. 
Over the last forty years, the meaning of the word has 
come to encompass much broader ideas including ‘free 
food’ or food without an owner. It is now used in 
conversations about hoarding or failing to share food.   
Hunger does not always push people apart – it can also 
strengthen social relations. As Luka Biong, a former 
director of the Center for Statistics and Evaluation (now 
the National Bureau of Statistics) that established the 
livelihood early warning system in the war-affected areas 
of South Sudan in the 1990s, and currently a professor at 
the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, has demonstrated, 
during times of hardship, the natural tendency is for 
people to come together to support one another.28 Among 
the Shilluk, for example, if a house is seen without fire for 
a few days, it serves as a sign that the people inside are 
unable to feed themselves and someone will arrange to 
bring food to them. One panellist recalled from her youth 
content/uploads/2017/01/HE-68-web.pdf. 
28 Luka Biong Deng takes this analysis deeper and shows how 
the strengthening of social ties is particularly pronounced when 
the source of the threat is outside of the community. See 
Changing Livelihoods in South Sudan, Humanitarian Exchange, 
No. 57, HPN and ODI (May 2013), 
https://odihpn.org/magazine/changing-livelihoods-in-south-
sudan/.  
11          The Politics of Humanitarianism: Perspectives from South Sudan 
 
how her father would leave out barrels of medida 
(‘porridge’) for people. One day, a woman came with her 
children and collapsed in front of the house and they had 
to spoon feed her.   
Extreme and persistent deprivation, coupled with 
decades of humanitarian assistance, have undermined 
social safety nets such as these and given rise to an 
expectation that when conflict breaks out, outsiders will 
come to provide support.29 These unintended 
consequences do not necessarily imply fault on the part 
of the humanitarian actors involved; to a certain extent, 
they are an unavoidable result of externalising 
responsibility for support during emergencies. The 
challenge for humanitarian agencies is to approach their 
interventions in such a way that they minimise harmful 
impacts and contribute to the strengthening of existing 
systems whenever possible. 
Once again, the lived experience of South Sudanese can 
shine a light into some of the important social dynamics 
of a society under extreme stress and identify agendas for 
more systematic research and creative support. 
One of the panellists related a story from Juba University 
that provided a simple illustration of how humanitarian 
assistance can strain reciprocal relationships. After the 
outbreak of violence in Juba in July 2016, a government 
official in the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs who 
happened to be a student at Juba University was able to 
arrange for one of the departments to receive 60 bags of 
rice. At the time, staff had gone for months without 
salaries and faced serious difficulties supporting their 
families. However, when a driver went to collect the 
aid, he had to flee without receiving the rice 
because serious confusion had broken out among the 
crowd at the distribution point, among people who had 
been excluded from the list of recipients. Within the 
University, there were also tensions as 
some departments did not receive any assistance. In this 
instance, a university in an urban setting was in need of 
support and yet the distribution of food aid 
strained relationships at a sensitive time.   
Another panellist recounted dynamics surrounding the 
distribution of food from the hub of Ajiep in Bahr-el-Ghazal 
during the famine of the 1990s. People would compose 
songs against those who were targeted to receive food, 
                                               
29 There is also a body of research that contends that 
dependency on food aid tend to be exaggerated in South 
Sudan. See e.g., Sarah Bailey and Simon Harrigan, Food 
Assistance, Reintegration and Dependency in South Sudan, 
London: ODI (2009).  
30 Luka Biong Deng, Famine in the Sudan: Causes, 
calling them the ‘compound people’. Whereas Dinka 
custom emphasised people’s obligation to provide food to 
one another during times of hunger, to the extent where 
someone suffering from hunger has the right to kill and 
eat a cow that does not belong to him, the provision and 
targeting of outside assistance served to undermine this 
sense of social responsibility and resilience.30 
Another story from the 22-year war illustrated a more 
direct impact on local authorities. One of the panellists 
recounted that the targeting of food aid through relief 
committees during the 1998 famine in Bahr-el-Ghazal 
made women vulnerable by asking certain women to 
select a limited number of recipients from the larger 
population. They subsequently took the blame for those 
who were excluded. One chief lamented this food aid 
targeting system by saying:31 
“It started when kawaja (white person) started 
asking who keeps grain?... He was told women keep 
grain… Kawaja then asked who keeps cattle?... He 
was told men keep cattle… Then kawaja said the 
women should be the ones to distribute and keep 
relief food and men with cattle…and you chiefs 
should keep away from food distribution… and leave 
it for women…The food distribution is now confused 
as women started selecting their relatives.”   
This food aid targeting system took authority and social 
obligations away from the chiefs who would normally 
make these sorts of decisions during food crises and 
placed them with a woman who would then have to go 
back to her community and face questions about why she 
chose to give food to one person and not another.  The 
humanitarian aspiration to empower women and 
recognise their role in providing food was admirable.  
However, as a result of the deeply engrained nature of 
gender inequalities in this context, such decisions could 
increase a woman’s vulnerability.   
While the examples above demonstrate instances in 
which humanitarian assistance undermined social 
cohesion, instances may also arise in which it has the 
opposite effect. During the 22-year war, the chiefs used 
humanitarian assistance to pay taxes to the SPLA. On the 
one hand, this is a clear example of diversion that served 
to benefit one party to the conflict.  On the other, the 
payment of taxes allowed chiefs to assert their authority 
Preparedness and Response: A Political, Social and Economic 
Analysis of the 1998 Bahr el Ghazal Famine. IDS (1999), 
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/13867 
31 Ibid, pp 85. 
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and create spaces of relative cohesion and security by 
avoiding arbitrary abuses by the SPLA.32 Additional 
research could help to reveal the double-edged nature of 
humanitarian assistance and develop more nuanced 
approaches that account for such dynamics. 
Impact on gender relations 
Humanitarian emergencies and interventions have 
significant implications for gender relations. Times of 
emergency can highlight the most vulnerable in South 
Sudan, and in South Sudan these are often women and 
especially women who do not have close male relatives.  
It is also clear that women have suffered extreme sexual 
violence during the current and previous wars. As Jok 
Madut Jok’s work shows, violence against woman began 
to escalate in the 1990s, alongside the militarisation of 
notions of masculinity.33 
Distribution methods can also have gendered impacts 
that prevent humanitarian assistance from reaching those 
who are most in need. A panellist recalled airdrops in 
Akobo in the late 1990s and how the community would 
gather the food items and take them to the local 
commander who would in turn distribute the food through 
male heads of household. Since the society was 
polygamous and the food was not enough for everyone, 
the system privileged men and many women were left out. 
With the support of the church, they were able to lobby 
the commander to instead register the women.  
The dominance of male humanitarian workers and their 
role in distributing relief can leave women more 
vulnerable. Because of this male dominance, women are 
potentially more susceptible to gender-based violence 
when they seek to access humanitarian assistance.34 
At the same time, proximity to international values and 
employment, as well as necessity in times of emergency, 
can help to positively reform social norms in favour of the 
                                               
32 Chirrilo Madut and Naomi Pendle, Wartime Trade and the 
Reshaping of Power in South Sudan: Learning from the market 
of Mayen Rual, Rift Valley Institute (2018) 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5bae251a4.html 
33 Jok, Madut Jok, Militarization and Gender Violence in South 
Sudan, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol.34(4) (1999), 
pp.427-442. 
34 For more on how dominant discourses of sexual violence in 
South Sudan have disregarded the historically violent civil-
military relations and structural violence connected with local 
political economies that commodify feminine identities and 
bodies, see Alicia Luedke and Hannah Logan, ‘That thing of 
human rights’: discourse, emergency assistance, and sexual 
violence in South Sudan's current civil war, Disasters, Vol. 42, 
Iss. S1 (27 Dec. 2017), 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/disa.12273.  
35 Grabska, K. (2013) The Return of Displaced Nuer in Southern 
equality of women.   During the wars of the 1990s, women 
who were in exile often had new educational 
opportunities.  This has helped empower them and 
increase their autonomy.35 This is especially the case in 
times of crisis when NGO employment opportunities 
increase. Many of the most prominent women nationally 
in South Sudan first gained authority when working for 
national NGOs that were funded by the international 
humanitarian response in the 1990s.  Jok Madut’s work 
recorded the role of the SPLA in forging a women’s role 
in the liberation struggle.36 
Humanitarian access 
The current conflict is generating many of the same 
barriers to access that people grappled with in the 22-year 
war.37 Restrictions on flight clearances, roadblocks, 
centralised distribution methods, and other constraints on 
access are forcing entire communities to move in search 
of food, as they have in the past.  
The subsections below explore these issues in greater 
detail with a focus on what drives competition for 
humanitarian assistance among armed groups and 
problems associated with centralised distribution of 
humanitarian resources. 
Competition among armed groups 
Competition for humanitarian assistance among armed 
groups is among the factors driving them to control where 
humanitarian access is provided. There is a tendency 
among the warring parties to treat people as commodities; 
they compete to have more people under their control in 
part because it brings more humanitarian supplies. As 
Joshua Craze has observed, competition for 
humanitarian resources is ‘part of a broader political 
economy of plunder and redistribution that typifies 
southern Sudan during times of war.’38 Among the first 
Sudan: Women Becoming Men?, Development and Change, 44 
(5), pp. 1135-1157. 
36 Jok, Madut Jok (1999), Militarization and Gender Violence in 
South Sudan, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol.34(4), 
pp.427-442. 
37 See e.g. Christine Monaghan, ‘Everyone and Everything Is a 
Target’: The Impact on Children of Attacks on Health Care and 
Denial of Humanitarian Access in South Sudan, Watchlist on 
Children and Armed Conflict (Apr. 2018), 
https://watchlist.org/wp-content/uploads/watchlist-field_report-
southsudan-web.pdf.  
38 See e.g., Joshua Craze, Displacement, Access, and Conflict 
in South Sudan: A longitudinal perspective, Conflict Sensitivity 
Resource Facility (CSRF) (May 2018), 
https://www.southsudanpeaceportal.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/CSRF-Research-Displacement-
Access-and-Conflict-in-South-Sudan.pdf.  
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acts for new armed groups is to establish a humanitarian 
wing in order to exercise authority over aid in territories 
under their control. Humanitarian access touches on a 
number of issues regarding the perceived legitimacy of 
state or non-state actors and serves as a nodal point 
around which hard bargaining for legitimacy occurs 
between armed groups and humanitarian agencies.  
These contests for legitimacy place the entire 
humanitarian operation on a knife-edge and become 
something humanitarians have to struggle with on a daily 
basis.  When armed opposition groups are able to access 
humanitarian resources, the government blames 
humanitarian agencies for providing support to the 
enemy. But if the agencies deny access to rebel-held 
areas to please the government, then opposition groups 
will escalate conflict and squeeze humanitarians to 
extract more concessions. This nexus between access, 
power and legitimacy is among the issues driving the 
threat against humanitarian workers. The 2016 NGO Act 
and 2014 National Security Service (NSS) Act can also 
be seen as an attempt through regulation to control 
humanitarian actors and ensure that assistance flows in a 
manner that supports the government’s military strategy. 
Drawbacks of centralised distribution 
Centralised methods of distribution can serve to heighten 
risks for recipients of humanitarian assistance. Several 
panellists noted the manner in which humanitarian 
agencies tend to organise their response around the 
centralised distribution of humanitarian assistance. 
Recipients of aid have to travel large distances in order to 
access enough assistance, which increases their 
exposure to violence and hunger. During the famine of the 
late 1990s, many people died simply trying to walk to the 
distribution centre at Ajiep. When people leave the 
distribution centres, they can also become targets for 
armed actors. Panellists recalled in the 1990s visiting 
SPLA storage facilities in Bahr-el-Ghazal that were full of 
food relief supplies; even as people were dying trying to 
access the distribution centre in Ajiep, SPLA commanders 
were taking half of the rations that each person received. 
The situation may have been even worse in government 
garrison towns.  
Similar dilemmas have been reported in the current 
conflict. In recent years in Leer and Mayendit, people 
have had to walk long distances between various feeding 
centres in order to get enough food. Humanitarians were 
confronted with the practical impossibilities of delivering 
aid closer to people’s homes, and the knowledge that the 
alternative would force people to travel significant 
distances. However, consequences were exaggerated 
when, on occasion, the amount of food distributed by 
humanitarians in a single site fell significantly short of 
what was needed for survival. In addition, often for 
reasons beyond humanitarians’ control (such as armed 
conflict), distributions did not always happen regularly, 
encouraging people to try to store up food aid. Therefore, 
many people tried to survive by walking between feeding 
centres and often registering more than once in order to 
receive adequate food. The way food was distributed, 
whether as a result of policy choices or difficult 
circumstances, effectively forced people who were close 
to starvation to walk significant distances across difficult 
terrain. The full impact that these long walks and periods 
away from local support networks have had on hunger, 
starvation, and people’s vulnerability to armed actors is 
yet to be fully understood.  
Conclusion  
The humanitarian sector in South Sudan is under 
immense pressure from all sides, whether from the 
dictates of the warring parties or budgetary constraints in 
donor capitals. It may seem perverse to expect the sector 
to undergo extensive reforms even as it is grappling with 
one of the world’s most complex emergencies. But 
perhaps a better way of approaching the problem is to 
recognise that humanitarian actors may continue to 
increase efficiency and impact by making further efforts to 
understand how aid interacts with politics, economics and 
social dynamics in South Sudan and using that 
understanding to develop more nuanced programmes.  
The panel discussion demonstrated the wealth of 
knowledge and experience possessed by South 
Sudanese academics and activists on humanitarian 
questions from both professional and personal 
perspectives, and the relevance of this for addressing 
humanitarian crisis. Despite the diverse political 
viewpoints among the panellists, they were able to offer 
common perspectives, which speaks to the ability of 
South Sudanese to rise above their differences and chart 
a collective way forward when given the chance. While 
efforts have been made to engage South Sudanese 
experts in discussions about humanitarianism in the past, 
they have tended to be on an individual and ad hoc basis. 
A more concerted effort would help to bridge the divides 
between international assistance and the lived 
experience of South Sudanese and contribute to a better 
understanding of how the challenges of humanitarianism 
can best be addressed. 
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Recommendations  
 
• Establish a regular forum of South Sudanese humanitarian experts for open exchanges with international 
practitioners and experts. The forum would meet regularly and focus on key humanitarian issues with an agenda 
informed by both sets of participants. 
 
• Develop strategies for and investment in connectivity between humanitarian leaders and grassroots communities in 
order to improve the responsiveness of humanitarian agencies to extreme hunger and famine, and to help 
humanitarians navigate complex social and political dynamics. 
 
• Examine in greater detail the role of customary mechanisms and chiefs’ courts in promoting accountability for hunger 
both historically and in the current context, including through such mechanisms as hunger courts. 
 
• Identify where pockets of local humanitarian activism arise and how they can best be supported, with particular 
attention to schools and higher education. This would include increasing recognition that educational institutions and 
civil society can make a humanitarian contribution. 
 
• Scrutinise honestly the consequences of current aid distribution patterns so that humanitarians can ensure that they 
have learnt from the devastating mistakes of the 1990s. 
 
• Examine the social and cultural impacts of humanitarianism, their differential impacts on men and women and their 
implications for the dignity and autonomy of individuals, families and communities.  
 
• Support journalism and media to expose hunger-related abuses in the interests of accountability. Increase 
programming that supports the flow of public information on these issues. 
 
• Examine the implications of current recruitment practices, and the forms of knowledge and skills that are valued in a 
humanitarian actor. Better appreciate the implications of these practices on programme design and the power 
relations between South Sudanese including between men and women.  
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